Arbitration—Oral Extension of Written Arbitration Clause Sufficient Under Section 1449 of Civil Practice Act by Buffalo Law Review
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 10 Number 1 Article 10 
10-1-1960 
Arbitration—Oral Extension of Written Arbitration Clause Sufficient 
Under Section 1449 of Civil Practice Act 
Buffalo Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Buffalo Law Review, Arbitration—Oral Extension of Written Arbitration Clause Sufficient Under Section 
1449 of Civil Practice Act, 10 Buff. L. Rev. 66 (1960). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol10/iss1/10 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ORAL EXTENSioN OF WRITTEN AiBITRATioN CLAUSE SUFFICIENT UNDER SEC-
TION 1449 OF CIvIL PRACTICE AcT
In Acadia Company v. Edlitz,'9 the Acadia Company, Edlitz's employer,
brought an action at Special Term to compel arbitration and to stay an action
instituted by defendant in the Municipal Court in the City of New York.
The facts of the case were undisputed and were as follows: Plaintiff em-
ployed defendant under a written agreement from July 22, 1957 to January 22,
1958. The agreement provided for arbitration of any question, difference, or
controversy arising as to the interpretation or performance under the contract.
Defendant conceded that prior to the expiration of the contract, the contract
was orally renewed and defendant's employment extended six months. Subse-
quently, the employment was terminated and a dispute arose over whether the
contract had been breached and as to wages due defendant.
The Supreme Court entered an order denying plaintiff's motion and the
Appellate Division affirmed3 ° Plaintiff then appealed to the Court of Appeals
and the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed with an order to grant plaintiff's
motion.
Section 1449 of the New York Civil Practice Act provides: "A contract to
arbitrate a controversy thereafter arising between the parties must be in writing.
Every submission to arbitrate an existing controversy is void unless it ... be in
writing and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith ..." (emphasis
added).
The Court of Appeals had no trouble determining that the oral renewal was
an adoption of the written contract with the only modification being the exten-
sion of the time of employment. Defendant had conceded that the contract had
been orally renewed. This raised the presumption that the renewal was based
on the original written agreement.2 ' This presumption is so strong that even
when notice of termination is given, continued employment will be deemed to
be on the terms and conditions of the original written contract of employment.
22
This determination, of course, satisfied the requirement of Section 1449
that a Contract to arbitrate a future controversy must be in writing but still
left the court with the problem of the party's signatures.
In In re Helen Whiting, Inc. (Trojan Textile, Corp.),23 defendant had
agreed to purchase three kinds of cloth from plaintiff. Plaintiff sent defendant
three contracts, one for each batch of cloth ordered. On the back of each
contract was a written agreement to arbitrate any controversy arising under the
contract. Defendant signed and sent to plaintiff one of the contracts but held
the other two and inforied plaintiffthat it did not want the other two batches.
19. 7 N.Y.2d 348, 197 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1960).
20. 8 A.D.2d 807, 187 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1st Dep't 1959).
21. Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891).
22. Carter v. Bradlee, 245 App. Div. 49, 280 N.Y. Supp. 368 (1st Dep't 1935).
23. 307 N.Y. 360, 121 N.E.2d 367 (1954).
COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
The Court of Appeals affirmed an order compelling defendant to submit to
arbitration all three contracts holding that Section 1449 was sufficiently com-
plied with.
The Court ruled, as they did here, that the second part of Section 1449
requires that the writing be signed, but the first part of the Section-the part
that deals with a contract to arbitrate a controversy thereafter arising-need
only be in writing and does not need to be signed.
ARBITRATION AwARD OF SPECIFIC PEPFORMSANCE
On a motion to confirm an arbitration award of specific performance,
2 4
the Court of Appeals, in Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Construction
Co.,25 was faced with the following situation: defendant repudiated its promise
to build a store for plaintiff in a proposed nine million dollar shopping center,
giving as cause plaintiff's inordinate delay in approving final plans for the
structure. The delay was alleged to have caused investors to regard the project
as a poor risk (plaintiff was the largest tenant), thus making it impossible for
defendant to obtain iortgage financing. The dispute was submitted, under
the terms of the contract, to the American Arbitration Association for resolu-
tion.25 The arbitrators found that plaintiff had acted in good faith in regard
to the approval of building plans and, therefore, that defendant had no basis
for repudiation; that mortgage financing was available, even if more costly
and, therefore, that defendant could not plead impossibility of performance.
The findings resulted in an award ordering defendant to proceed with con-
struction.
In affirming decisions of Special Term27 and the Appellate Division- s
confirming the arbitration award of specific performance, the Court of Appeals
held that, assuming the Court could overturn an arbitration award of specific
performance on the basis that it would have discretion to overturn a similar
decree of equity, this award is neither inconsistent with the relief available
in equity or an overreaching of the arbitrators' power, and should, therefore,
be confirmed.
The Civil Practice Act, Sections 1462 and 1462-a dearly label the grounds
upon which the court may vacate an arbitration award. Section 1462(4) pro-
vides that the award'may be vacated "Where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award
upon the subject-matter was not made." Among the provisions this stands
as the only one permitting an exercise of judicial discretion. The first question
for the Court became, then, what is the measure of that discretion? Is it, as
24. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1461.
25. 8 N.Y.2d 133, 202 N.YS.2d 303 (1960).
26. The rules under which this body operates specifically provide that the arbitrators
may grant specific performance as a remedy.
27. 9 Misc. 2d 796, 168 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
28. 7 A.D.2d 367, 183 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1st Dep't 1959).
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